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Abstract
Since the invention of Bitcoin one decade ago, numerous cryptocurrencies have sprung into existence.
Among these, proof-of-work is the most common mechanism for achieving consensus, whilst a
number of coins have adopted “ASIC-resistance” as a desirable property, claiming to be more
“egalitarian,” where egalitarianism refers to the power of each coin to participate in the creation
of new coins. While proof-of-work consensus dominates the space, several new cryptocurrencies
employ alternative consensus, such as proof-of-stake in which block minting opportunities are based
on monetary ownership. A core criticism of proof-of-stake revolves around it being less egalitarian
by making the rich richer, as opposed to proof-of-work in which everyone can contribute equally
according to their computational power. In this paper, we give the first quantitative definition
of a cryptocurrency’s egalitarianism. Based on our definition, we measure the egalitarianism of
popular cryptocurrencies that (may or may not) employ ASIC-resistance, among them Bitcoin,
Ethereum, Litecoin, and Monero. Our simulations show, as expected, that ASIC-resistance increases
a cryptocurrency’s egalitarianism. We also measure the egalitarianism of a stake-based protocol,
Ouroboros, and a hybrid proof-of-stake/proof-of-work cryptocurrency, Decred. We show that stake-
based cryptocurrencies, under correctly selected parameters, can be perfectly egalitarian, perhaps
contradicting folklore belief.
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1 Introduction
In 2008, Satoshi Nakamoto proposed Bitcoin [24], the first and most successful cryptocurrency
to date. Bitcoin introduced a cryptographic consensus protocol in which transactions are
organized into blocks which are put in a globally agreed sequence, the blockchain, despite
the presence of adversaries and without the need of any setup or identity system. Since its
inception, a plethora of alternative cryptocurrencies, or “altcoins,” have sprung into existence,
each claiming its own features.
A major thread of research has focused on the mandates of block generation, specifically
the mechanism of identifying the party responsible for producing a new block at any point.
Bitcoin, as well as the majority of altcoins, employs proof-of-work [11], where block generation
is called mining and blocks are produced by miners who expend computational power to
solve cryptographic puzzles. On the other hand, the most prominent alternative mechanism is
proof-of-stake. In proof-of-stake, block generation is called minting and blocks are produced
by minters who “stake” their coins, i.e., users who own a set of coins and use them to
participate in the consensus protocol. Intuitively, in both cases a leader is drawn at regular
intervals at random from the block generators population, with a probability of selection
proportional to their computational power or stake respectively.
Block generators are incentivized to produce blocks by receiving a reward for each block
they successfully produce and which is subsequently adopted in the resulting blockchain. In
many cryptocurrencies, the rewards serve a dual purpose: incentivise the the miners/minters
but also create and distribute the underlying cryptocurrency to the system’s maintainers.
Taking this into account, in this paper, we consider the block generators as investors and
focus on the comparison of the expected returns of investors with different purchasing power.
The central economic property which arises is that of cryptocurrency egalitarianism. In an
ideal world, investing a certain amount of capital to produce blocks should result in rewards
proportional to that capital; that is, both a poor investor and a rich investor should receive
returns in proportion to their investment in expectation. In this point of view, wealthy
investors should not be rewarded with disproportionate rewards and everybody should have
equal opportunity to both participate and earn rewards. As we will see, this is far from true
with most cryptocurrencies today.
Until now, the term egalitarianism has been left undefined, although several cryptocurren-
cies claim to be more egalitarian than others [30] [23]. However, lacking a quantifiable metric,
the question of whether some cryptocurrencies are more egalitarian than others remains ill
posed. Our paper aims at putting forth the first concrete definition of egalitarianism, in a way
which is generic and can be applied to any cryptocurrency. Our definition provides a metric,
which can be practically measured and used to compare different cryptocurrencies. Using our
model, we measure the egalitarianism of four indicative proof-of-work–based cryptocurrencies:
Bitcoin, Litecoin [21], Ethereum [6, 31], and Monero [30]. Bitcoin, being the first and most
successful cryptocurrency to date, was chosen as the baseline of comparison. Ethereum
is the most promising altcoin and is currently the largest decentralized cryptocurrency by
market cap after Bitcoin2. Litecoin and Monero, although not next by market cap, make
claims [30, 23] of increased egalitarianism because of their design. We assess their claims and
find them in agreement with our data, thus presenting for the first time economic comparisons
which quantify them precisely. On the pure proof-of-stake side, as will soon become clear,
2 All references to market cap in this paper are made according to https://coinmarketcap.com [January
2019].
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egalitarian behavior is similar across all coins independently of externalities such as hardware
characteristics. Therefore, it suffices to perform a case study of an indicative proof-of-stake
protocol. We study the case of pure proof-of-stake, applied on a protocol consistent with
Ouroboros [19], as well as a hybrid proof-of-work/proof-of-stake cryptocurrency, Decred [9].
We find that, in an open market, pure proof-of-stake coins can be perfectly egalitarian, con-
trary to their proof-of-work counterparts. However, we note that variations of proof-of-stake,
such as “delegated proof-of-stake,” may not be perfectly egalitarian, since the delegates, i.e.,
the leaders of the stake pools which are formed, typically earn extra profits for managing the
stake pools [5].
Our Contributions and Roadmap. This work provides a quantitative evaluation of cryp-
tocurrency egalitarianism. To the best of our knowledge this is the first work to provide a
treatment of this property and acts as the foundation for comparing cryptocurrency fairness
when it comes to reward distribution. Specifically, the contributions of our research are
summarized as follows:
1. We define an exact measure of cryptocurrency egalitarianism; to do this, we first define
the egalitarian curve of a cryptocurrency from which we extract the measure.
2. We measure and compare the egalitarian curve and egalitarianism of four indicative
proof-of-work cryptocurrencies (Bitcoin, Ethereum, Litecoin, Monero), one representative
proof-of-stake protocol (Ouroboros), and a hybrid cryptocurrency (Decred), using current
market data.
3. We show that proof-of-stake, when correctly parameterized, is, perhaps unexpectedly,
perfectly egalitarian.
The rest of this paper is structured as follows. We begin by reviewing related work and
preliminaries in Sections 2 and 3. Next, we put forth our definition for the egalitarian curve
and egalitarianism of a cryptocurrency and motivate its intuition in Section 4. In Section 5
we present empirical data for several cryptocurrencies of interest and evaluate them under
our model, in order to deduce whether previous intuitive claims are indeed correct. Finally,
the conclusions of our research are drawn in Section 6.
2 Related work
The macro and microeconomics of blockchain design have been studied from several perspect-
ives but remain an active area of research with a number of open questions. Incentives for
block generation according to the honest protocol have been explored for both proof-of-work
and proof-of-stake.
Proof-of-work protocols such as Bitcoin were formalized in the Bitcoin Backbone [14, 15]
papers and follow-up works [25]. The seminal work of Selfish Mining [12, 28] showed that
the honest behavior is not incentive-compatible in Bitcoin, but the protocol can be modified
to behave that way. However, in restricted models, Bitcoin can be shown to be incentive-
compatible [18]. Proof-of-stake protocols such as Ouroboros [19] can be designed from the
ground up to be incentive-compatible. The question of how to incentivize parties to conduct
pool formation into the desired number of pools, or groups of minters, was studied in [5].
The above works study the incentives of blockchain systems from the designer’s point of
view so that participants do not deviate from the prescribed protocol. A related question is
how fair the protocol is to participants themselves, and in particular to honest participants.
The Backbone and Selfish Mining works include attacks in which an adversary can strategically
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harm chain quality, causing the number of blocks and, in turn, the respective rewards, to be
disproportionate to their contributed computational power, thereby harming fairness against
honest participants. Fruitchains [26] proposes a protocol which solves this problem. In these
works, handing out rewards in exact proportion to computational power is considered “fair.”
Egalitarianism, in the way considered in the paper, has been studied in proof-of-work
systems from a technological point of view with respect to memory-hard functions in [2, 3].
However, the question of whether computational power grows proportionally to capital
invested, i.e., whether larger wealth results in more than proportional rewards, has not been
previously studied. Therefore, our work aims at filling this gap by studying the effects of
economies of scale when applied to cryptocurrency generation.
Equitability of cryptocurrencies. Fanti et al. analyze economic blockchain fairness in [13],
where they define equitability. They study the evolution of a system after a series of rounds,
putting forth the property that stake ownership remains in proportion before and after
rewards have been awarded. By studying the behaviour of the returns’ variance under
the randomness of executions, they show that the distribution of capital follows a Pólya
process. Our work augments their results by quantifying the expectation of rewards and
then studying the variance under the randomness of initial capital allocation. In our work,
we show that computational power is not proportional to the invested capital, and hence
the analogy between proof-of-work computational power and proof-of-stake capital breaks
down, and a more detailed study is needed. Additionally, we remark that proof-of-work
miners also reinvest their proceeds in the mining operation, albeit slowly, as proof-of-stake
minters do. For example, empirical data show that large-scale miners pay for electricity using
their proceeds [17]. Hence, both mining and minting follow Pólya processes as modelled by
their paper. Regardless, egalitarianism and equitability are orthogonal. A cryptocurrency
can be perfectly egalitarian and poorly equitable and vice versa. It is possible to obtain a
cryptocurrency both egalitarian and equitable by adopting correctly parameterized proof-of-
stake under a geometric reward function.
3 Preliminaries
Before studying the egalitarianism of different cryptocurrency consensus mechanisms, we
provide a description of the leader election process, which is a central part of each block-
chain consensus mechanism. We give an overview of the details of the two most common
decentralized consensus mechanisms, proof-of-work and proof-of-stake, in order to establish
an understanding of the differences in egalitarianism between the two models.
Proof-of-work. The core idea behind proof-of-work cryptocurrencies is solving the proof-of-
work inequality. Specifically, the mining hardware is provided with two constants, previd
and data, i.e., the id of the tip of the adopted blockchain and the data which need to be
appended to it. The mining device then brute-force searches for some string nonce, such
that H(previd||data||nonce) ≤ T for some hash function H defined by the system. Here,
T is a – relatively – small number called the difficulty target, which is adjusted in order to
ensure a stable block production rate, although typically remains constant for periods of
consecutive blocks called epochs – for example, in Bitcoin, epochs are 2016 blocks long [4].
Because the search for solutions is brute-forced, the expected number of solutions found by
a given miner is proportional to the number of evaluations of the hash function H she can
obtain in a given time frame.
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The number of hash evaluations is one of the several critical parameters to consider when
purchasing mining hardware. Other important parameters include the price of a mining
unit, as well as its electricity consumption. Mining hardware is divided in various tiers based
on performance, namely CPU miners, GPU miners, FPGA miners, and specialized ASIC
miners [29]. Although the pricing of such devices may be similar, the hashing rate and, in
turn, the return on investment, is highly dependent on the hardware’s tier. For example, the
mining hardware “Whatsminer M10” produced by the company “MicroBT” costs $1,022.00
per unit and produces $0.104266 per hour of operation in net gains, i.e., average mined
Bitcoins per hour denominated in US dollars with today’s prices (December 2018) minus
the electricity costs. On the other hand, the mining hardware “8 Nano Pro” produced by
the company “ASICMiner” costs $6,000.00 per unit, but produces $0.315327 per hour of
operation in net gains, i.e., almost three times the hourly net gains of its cheaper competitor.
Thus, if one can afford to purchase the more expensive hardware, each of their subsequent
dollar invested in electricity returns more mined coins.
It has long been folklore knowledge in the blockchain community that mining becomes
more egalitarian by using a memory-hard proof-of-work function. This intuition is correct, the
core reason being the difficulty to construct specialized hardware for memory-hard functions.
For example, no ASICs currently exist for Monero mining. Therefore, the only way to scale
mining operations is by purchasing more hardware. However, since the mining hardware
in this case varies little, both in terms of cost and performance, scaling returns become
proportional to investments. To the best of our knowledge, this paper is the first to confirm
this correspondence between the memory-hardness of proof-of-work hash functions and the
economics of mining.
I Remark 1 (Block generation at scale). We only analyze the scaling of the economics of
mining with respect to hardware. We also do not take into account basic costs such as
shipping and the availability of a basic machine to co-ordinate mining (such as a personal
computer not performing mining itself). A multitude of additional factors play important
roles for mining operations, such as space rental costs, machine cooling and maintenance
costs, as well as bulk electricity purchase. As is common in economies of scale, these relative
costs are reduced for large-scale operations, although they are similar for all proof-of-work
cryptocurrencies and thus do not affect relative comparisons between them. We also remark
that we analyze mining costs for small capital investments. If larger capital, e.g. above a few
million US dollars, is available, corporations can develop their own specialized hardware and
gain a competitive advantage by treating it as a trade secret [29]. Indeed, these details make
our comparison in favour of proof-of-stake more pronounced, as proof-of-stake operations
do not incur such types of costs and do not lend themselves to specialized mining hardware
research. We leave the analysis and calculation of egalitarianism under these parameters for
future work.
Proof-of-stake. In proof-of-stake, a minter is selected in proportion to the stake they hold,
which is to say proportionally to the amount of money they own. There exist a number
of flavours of this process. In one case, all coins automatically participate in the leader
election process – this is the case for Ouroboros [19] and Ethereum’s Casper [7]. In a second
flavour, the stake has to opt-in to participate in the election by a special process, such as
purchasing a ticket or becoming a delegate of the stake of other users. This is the case for
cryptocurrencies such as Decred [9] and EOS [20]. Among those participating in the election,
a leader is elected at random, in proportion to their stake.
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Proof-of-stake is often criticized for its lack of egalitarianism. The rationale is that, in
proof-of-stake, the more money one stakes, the more money one generates. Thus, the rich
get richer, which is precisely the opposite of egalitarianism. Additionally, in proof-of-stake
systems, the money owners could constitute a closed, rich club, refusing to share the assets
with any outsiders. In contrast, this argument claims, proof-of-work is naturally egalitarian:
everyone is paid not according to the money they own, but according to the computational
power they put to work. In this case, since computational power is a natural thing and
cannot be exclusively owned, a closed rich club cannot be formed. Although this argument
seems agreeable at first, the results of our work contradict it. In fact, correctly parameterized
stake-based systems are much more egalitarian than work-based ones.
It is instructive to dispel the above argument intuitively, before we support our position
with data. Firstly, the argument that money can be exclusively owned, but computational
power cannot, is misguided. Indeed, this may be true in the case of a peculiar oligopoly, where
a small faction of parties mutually agrees to never sell to outsiders, despite external demand.
However, in an open market, both money and computational power can be freely purchased
and, in fact, any non-negligible amount of computational power must be necessarily purchased
that way. In the present work, we assume an open market for both mining hardware
and financial capital which allows participation in the respective systems. Therefore, given
that both money and computational power are purchasable, we now need to consider the
funds one needs to invest either in technology or in financial capital in order to maximize the
returns from a cryptocurrency’s block generation mechanisms. The amount of cryptocurrency
generated by a given investment can be concretely measured and compared, thus the question
can now be analyzed quantitatively and answered concretely.
We should note that variations of proof-of-stake, such as “delegated proof-of-stake,” may
not be perfectly egalitarian, since the delegates, i.e., the leaders of the stake pools which are
formed, typically earn extra profits for managing the stake pools [5]. In this paper, we only
concern ourselves with non-delegated variants, i.e., pure proof-of-stake protocols. We leave
the study of the contrast between pool formation mechanism truthfulness (or Sybil-resilience)
and egalitarianism for future work.
4 Defining egalitarianism
Having established the basics of consensus mechanisms, we now propose the first definition of
an economic measure of egalitarianism in cryptocurrencies. Before we present our definition,
let us first state the desiderata of such a definition. First of all, we want to allow concrete
measurements to be performed on cryptocurrencies and data to be extracted in a manner that
is quantitative and not vague. Thus far, the claims for egalitarianism in various cryptocurren-
cies have been hand wavy, using a rhetoric which fails to include exact data [30, 23]. As such,
different cryptocurrencies claim egalitarianism over the others, without demonstrating the
claims or provide conclusive arguments. Secondly, a definition of egalitarianism must measure
the block generation returns of a “rich dollar” compared to that of a “poor dollar.” We thus
desire a measure which, for a particular cryptocurrency, extracts a smaller value to indicate
a lack of egalitarianism (e.g. a case where large wealth generates blocks disproportionately
faster than small wealth) and a larger value to indicate perfect egalitarianism (where every
invested dollar has exactly equal power in terms of cryptocurrency generation).
As a means towards establishing our egalitarianism definition, we define the egalitarian
curve f of a cryptocurrency. The horizontal axis of this curve plots the financial capital which
is available for investment denominated in a fiat currency, USD.3 The vertical axis plots the
3 Given that we explore a small investment duration, it makes little difference whether these are nominal
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Return On Investment (ROI), which measures the cryptocurrency amount that is freshly
generated in the investment period and remains unspent at the end of the investment period,
given an optimal allocation of the initial capital. We require the Return On Investment is
necessarily freshly generated cryptocurrency; thus, it must be newly mined or minted, and
not part of the initial capital. Of course, purchasing cryptocurrency which has already been
generated is an investment option, but it is immaterial to our egalitarianism definition, which
focuses on measuring the egalitarianism of freshly generated cryptocurrency. Finally, the
curve is plotted with a fixed investment duration in mind – in this paper, we use a duration
of 1 year. Naturally, curves of different cryptocurrencies can be compared only if they use
the same duration.
I Definition 2 (Egalitarian curve). Given a cryptocurrency c, an investment period interval d,
the set of all possible investment strategies B, we define the egalitarian curve fc,d : R+ −→ R+
of c for investment period d as:
fc,d(v) =
max
B∈B
E[B(v)]− v
v
The value max
B∈B
E[B(v)] identifies the maximum expectation of returns across all investment
strategies B, i.e., the amount of returns which the optimal strategy ensures for a given initial
capital v. The expectation is taken with the blockchain execution as a random variable,
since returns vary by execution (the randomness of the execution can affect the returns of
the strategy, as the same strategy can bring larger returns if the participant is “lucky” and
happens to produce many blocks [13]).
We remark that we do allow strategies to reinvest capital. For instance, returns earned
from mining rewards can be reinvested in electricity costs for future mining. Furthermore, for
unit consistency, we assume the strategy B(v) returns the freshly generated coins denominated
in the same units as the capital v was given in, such that f represents a ROI; thus, we
denominate the generated cryptocurrencies in USD using the market exchange rate.
It is now straightforward to define the ideal egalitarian curve. In this case, the ROI is
stable regardless of capital invested. Under these ideal conditions, the amount of freshly
generated cryptocurrency is exactly proportional to the money invested. Thus, the ideal
curve is any constant curve.
As an interesting thought experiment, consider the egalitarian curve which is decreasing.
In this case, the poor would receive proportionally more newly created cryptocurrencies for
every dollar they invest, i.e., it would be a redistribution of wealth from the rich to the poor.
However, one can quickly see that, in decentralized cryptocurrencies where the identities of
the participants are unknown, it is impossible to hope for something better than the constant
curve. Indeed, the fact that decentralized cryptocurrencies allow anonymous generation of
new identities [10] allows a rich investor to split their investment into smaller ones. Thus,
if the curve were ever to have a negative slope, the sum of the smaller splits of the rich
investment would achieve a higher gain. By the definition of the curve, which mandates that
it depicts the ROI of an optimal investment, this would be a contradiction. The following
lemma makes the above intuition more precise:
I Lemma 3 (Sybil strategies). Fix a cryptocurrency c and an investment period interval d.
Given capital v, for every natural number i ∈ N?, it holds that fc,d(v) ≤ fc,d(i · v).
USD or real USD, as long as they are the same when applying comparisons.
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The proof of this Lemma is available in Appendix A.
Using our definition of the egalitarian curve, we now define egalitarianism as a concrete
number. We begin by considering the initial capital v as a random variable following a
certain distribution D. Egalitarianism is defined as the variance of the expected ROI when
the capital is chosen from the given distribution.
I Definition 4 (Egalitarianism). Given a cryptocurrency c, an investment period duration
d and an initial capital distribution D, we define the egalitarianism e of c for investment
duration d under initial capital distribution D as follows:
ec,d,D = −Varv←D[fc,d(v)]
where f is the egalitarian curve of c.
The intuition behind this definition is that, to have egalitarianism, the ROI must remain
the same across different capital investments. As such, any deviation from the mean is
non-egalitarian. Naturally, if the egalitarianism of a certain cryptocurrency is higher than
another’s, we say that the former is more egalitarian than the latter. Of course, to be
accurate, such comparisons must only be made after fixing the parameters c and d as well
as the initial capital distribution D. We will now fix the distribution D to be the uniform
distribution between a minimum and a maximum capital. This choice corresponds to the
intuition that the returns are the same for all initial capitals alike. Clearly a cryptocurrency
with an ideal egalitarian curve is perfectly egalitarian, as we now define.
I Definition 5 (Perfect egalitarianism). A cryptocurrency c is perfectly egalitarian for
investment duration d and initial capital distribution D if ec,d,D = 0.
5 Experimental results
Having established our theoretical framework, we now provide experimental results on the
egalitarianism of various cryptocurrencies. Our experiments utilize the egalitarian curve
definition of Section 4 in order to concretely confirm – or disprove – the egalitarianism claims
of some of the major, both proof-of-work and proof-of-stake, cryptocurrencies.
In conducting our experiments we assume a static environment. Specifically, we
assume that the token prices, as well as the distribution of funds which are available for
purchasing mining hardware are static and follow the snapshot of the world which we took
at the time of writing. Furthermore, we assume that our mining operation would not
substantially affect these parameters if it were to be applied on this environment. Finally,
we assume that the set of available strategies B comprises of the honest strategies, e.g. not
including selfish mining which could provide better ROI by diverging from the protocol.
Proof-of-work. We have experimentally analyzed the egalitarianism of the following proof-
of-work coins: Bitcoin, Litecoin, Ethereum, and Monero. These cryptocurrencies act as
a representative sample among the thousands of existing cryptocurrencies. Bitcoin is the
largest and most successful cryptocurrency by market cap. Litecoin is the first cryptocurrency
aimed at becoming more egalitarian by replacing Bitcoin’s SHA256 work function with
scrypt [27], a more memory-hard function. Ethereum is one of the most promising alternative
cryptocurrencies, the first to support smart contracts, and the second largest by market cap;
its work function is different from both Bitcoin and Litecoin. Finally, Monero is special with
claims of strong egalitarianism due to its memory-hard mining function, Cryptonight [30].
Furthermore, its protocol is often updated to maintain egalitarianism [8].
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Table 1 A list of the parameters used in our proof-of-work mining simulations. Some parameters
are system-agnostic, whereas others depend on the cryptocurrency c.
Variable Description Unit BTC ETH LTC XMR DCR
|d| duration of investment years 1
ec electricity cost USD / kWh 0.08
bgr(c) block generation rate blocks / s 1 / 600 1 / 14.7 1 / 150 1 / 120 1 / 298
thr(c) total hash rate Thash / s 34,727,437 179.50374 174.537 0.00033859 178,760
br(c) reward per block tokens 12.5 3 25 3.37 11.38
tp(c) token price token / USD 4,074.25 126.12 32.10 47.27 18.62
As expected, our experiments show that Bitcoin is the least egalitarian of the four, with
Ethereum following next. Monero is more egalitarian than both, with Litecoin being the
most egalitarian among the proof-of-work coins we have studied.
For our experimental setting, we worked as follows. First, we collected empirical data
which describe the available mining hardware options in the market. For each machine choice,
we determined the cost of investment. This is comprised of its initial price (in USD) as well
as its energy cost of operation (in Watts). The cost of operation was translated to USD per
hour by considering the electricity cost of KWh. As a reference, we used the lowest average
KWh cost in the United States, i.e., $0.08 per KWh [1]. This reference electricity cost is an
estimation which can vary depending on the country of operation.
Second, we use the reported hash rate of each mining hardware machine to extract
an expectation of the freshly mined coins it would generate per hour, if it were to run
continuously. This expectation is taken over the randomness of all honest blockchain protocol
executions. As such, each party is awarded block rewards in proportion to their computational
power. The difference between revenue per unit of time and cost of operation per unit of time
produces an income rate, which is measured in USD per hour. For our experiments, we use
an interval of investment with |d| = 1 year. Although this choice is arbitrary, it corresponds
to the usual definition of ROI in traditional finance.
Our investment strategy is as follows. The initial available capital is allocated to an upfront
technology investment, in which an integer instance of the Unbounded Knapsack problem
[22] is solved using dynamic programming4 to optimize the total cash flow. Subsequently,
as long as the cash flow is positive, the purchased machines operate for the indicated total
duration, reinvesting part of the freshly minted coins in electricity costs, in order to generate
more coins. Eventually, this strategy produces an income of freshly generated coins, which
have not been spent and are reported as the strategy’s income.
To calculate our concrete numbers, we employ the constants shown in Table 1. We
use the expected block generation rates for each cryptocurrency, as well as the reward per
block, token price, and mining difficulty at the time of writing, all of which we assume
remain constant. The variance of electricity cost, the duration of investment, as well as small
fluctuations in price and difficulty do not qualitatively change the shape of our egalitarian
curves (see Appendix C).
LetM denote the set of all available mining machines. For each machine m ∈M, our
empirically collected data specifies the following parameters:
(i) the energy consumption rate ecr(m) in Watts,
(ii) an initial cost of purchase ic(m) in USD, and
(iii) a hash rate hr(m) in Terahashes per second.
4 The source code of our implementation for this calculation is available in our repository.
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Given the above, we can now calculate the expected income rate per hour E[ir(m)] for a
given machine m and a cryptocurrency c. In the following equation, the first part identifies
the income per hour, i.e., the amount of tokens (denominated in USD) which the machine
produces per hour, whereas the second part of the equation identifies the electricity cost, i.e.,
the product of the consumed electricity multiplied by the price of a single KWh:
E[ir(m)] = 3600 · hr(m)thr(c) · br(c) · bgr(c) · tp(c)− ecr(m) · ec
There are many possible configurations for technology investments. Each configuration
comprises of a number of copies n ∈ N of every machine type m ∈M. Therefore, we define
each configuration as m ⊆M×N, with total initial cost of investment for such configuration
being ic(m) =
∑
(m,n)∈m n · ic(m).
The above figure is given in USD per hour and, since the initial capital should suffice
to buy the machines of the configuration, we require that ic(m) ≤ v, where v is the initial
available capital at the beginning of the simulation.
Now, in order to identify the strategy’s optimal net income for the interval d, we iterate
over all possible machine configurations, for which the above inequality holds, and choose
the one with the maximum returns:
BOPT(v) = max {
∑
(m,n)∈m
|d|E[ir(m)] : m ⊆M× N ∧ ic(m) ≤ v}
We note that this is only an approximation to the optimal (in our limited model) solution,
which we used in our simulations. We consider this sufficiently close to optimal to allow for
the calculation of egalitarianism. We give an integer programming formulation of the optimal
strategy for capital allocation in Appendix B. We remark here that the general problem
of mining hardware allocation (including our simplified approximation) is computationally
hard [16], as both the Knapsack and the Integer Programming problems are NP-complete.
As the simulation parameters are many and diverse, in order to allow others to run the
experiments with different values, as well as for reasons of reproducibility and falsifiability,
we openly release our mining investment optimizer as well as our data for public use5.
The egalitarianism of Bitcoin, Ethereum, Litecoin and Monero are shown in Figures 1a,
1b, 1c, and 1d respectively. Decred is a hybrid proof-of-work/proof-of-stake cryptocurrency,
in which block generation is a collaboration between miners and minters. Specifically, each
block which is mined via proof-of-work needs to be “vouched for” by a certain number of
minters, who give it a vote of confidence. Both the miners and the minters who participate
in block generation are rewarded. An investor can therefore choose to participate in Decred
by either investing in mining hardware and performing proof-of-work, or by purchasing stake
and performing proof-of-stake (or a combination thereof). We note that the choice of whether
to mine or mint Decred is not always clear. While mining may be more profitable for a
certain initial capital, it can also carry various risks. For instance, if the difficulty increases,
the mining hardware may be rendered inefficient and also hard to sell. Proof-of-work also
carries the operational overhead discussed in Remark 1. On the other hand, stake can always
be sold, although the price may fluctuate, and carries negligible operational overhead. As
the decision between the two is not obvious, we analyze both strategies independently. The
egalitarianism of proof-of-work mining for Decred is shown in Figure 1d.
5 Our mining investment calculator and our mining hardware data are available under the MIT license
and a Creative Commons 4.0 Attribution License respectively at https://github.com/decrypto-org/
egalitarianism.
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Figure 1 Egalitarianism curves of the proof-of-work cryptocurrencies analyzed in this work.
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(b) Pure proof-of-stake Ouroboros
Figure 2 The egalitarianism curves of the proof-of-stake systems analyzed in this work.
It is evident from all figures that the ROI is “capped” by a maximum value, which is
observed in specified intervals. Indeed, this value identifies the ROI of the best available
machine and is in line with Lemma 3. In other words, as long as an investor is able to buy
the machine which returns the most profits, then they achieve the best possible ROI. In
case an investor does not have enough capital to buy the best mining product, they may
buy a less profitable machine and achieve less, though still positive, ROI. This observation
explains the small spikes in ROI which may be seen e.g. in Bitcoin’s figure for capital in
the range [0, 2000]. Also, in case the capital is more than the cost of the machine, then the
remaining capital is effectively discarded. Therefore, although two investors A,B may start
with initial capital vA < vB , if their returns, in absolute terms, are the same, then the ROI
of B will be smaller as a percentage compared to the ROI of A. This observation explains
the decrease in ROI after the spikes. Finally, we observe that, as the capital increases, the
ROI converges to the cap. This is explained by the fact that the “discarded” capital, i.e., the
capital which cannot be invested in mining hardware, is a significantly smaller percentage of
the total capital for large investments.
Proof-of-stake. We now analyze the proof-of-stake egalitarianism in two settings. First,
we consider pure proof-of-stake, which can be applied on top of a protocol like Ouroboros. In
this case, pure is in opposition to delegated proof-of-stake, a setting where the stakeholders
are required to delegate their stake to other parties, namely “stake pools” and is deployed
in cryptocurrencies such as EOS, Bitshares, and others. Second, we consider the case of
minting Decred via its proof-of-stake mechanism.
The egalitarian curve for staking Decred is illustrated in Figure 2a. As mentioned above,
Decred is an opt-in staking cryptocurrency, where staking occurs by purchasing so-called
tickets. Since the price of a ticket is quantized, egalitarianism is harmed for capitals which
are not multiples of ticket prices. However, one can see that the envelope of maxima of this
curve is perfectly egalitarian. The spikes that cause the discontinuity of the curve are due to
the large ticket price (currently $1756), which in Decred is determined by the market and is
high due to the limited supply of tickets available per ticket pool, a parameter inherent in
their protocol. Perfect egalitarianism could in principle be achieved by making the ticket
price approach 0.
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Table 2 A comparison of the egalitarianism values of the cryptocurrencies explored in this study.
Name Consensus mechanism Egalitarianism
Bitcoin Proof-of-work -0.034490298
Ethereum Proof-of-work -0.006926114
Litecoin Proof-of-work -0.000271822
Monero Proof-of-work -0.002206135
Decred Proof-of-workProof-of-stake
-0.412524642
-0.000348280
Ouroboros Proof-of-stake -0.000000295
In the case of Ouroboros, every coin has the same probability of being chosen for
eligibility [19]. When a coin is eligible for block generation, its owner can create a block by
providing a proof of ownership of the chosen coin. Consider the case of a cryptocurrency
with N coins in circulation. When a block needs to be created, a coin is chosen at random
from the set of N coins. Therefore, each coin may be chosen with 1N probability. Then
the address which owns the chosen coin, in other words the stakeholder which controls this
coin, is eligible to generate a block and receive the block rewards associated with it6. In
our experiments, we assume that every block is associated with a constant reward, which
pertains to newly minted coins. Furthermore, since computational power does not affect
the rate of block production, it is reasonable to assume that both the electricity and the
hardware equipment’s price is constant for all users, regardless of stake accumulation, so all
users can participate using – relatively – cheap resources (cf. Remark 1).
Figure 2b depicts the simulation of a pure proof-of-stake system. In this case, the users
pay a set transaction fee for the purchase of the initial stake. The rest of their capital is
allocated as stake. The figure suggests that this system is closer to perfect egalitarianism
compared to the rest of our case studies.
Summary. Our findings are summarized in Table 2. We find that Bitcoin is the least
egalitarian, followed in turn by Ethereum, Monero, and Litecoin7. The latter two are the
most egalitarian due to their use of CryptoNight and scrypt respectively. Mining with Decred
provides the worst egalitarianism of all tested coins. However, the most egalitarian coins
involve staking. Decred staking, due to its quantized ticket pricing, is only approximately
egalitarian and comparable to the performance of mining Litecoin. Pure proof-of-stake, which
allows continuous staking, is almost perfectly egalitarian, its small divergence from perfect
egalitarianism stemming from the small capital which is required to pay the transation fees8
to participate in the staking process.
6 Conclusion
In this work we explore the notion of egalitarianism of cryptocurrencies. Although this notion
has long been discussed, we are the first to give a definition, which allows us to concretely
argue about the egalitarianism of various existing systems.
6 This slightly deviates from the work of [19] in the fact that the payout in our case is due to freshly
minted coins and not fees. However, the reward schedule is identical.
7 Litecoin may appear to have better egalitarianism compared to Monero due to limited availability of
mining machines. More data are needed to economically compare scrypt and CryptoNight mining.
8 As of January 2019, according to https://cardanoexplorer.com/, in the Cardano implementation of
Ouroboros these fees are in the order of $0.01.
Tokenomics 2019
7:14 Cryptocurrency Egalitarianism
The results of our experimental simulations are very optimistic in terms of usability of
our metric, as they provide concrete figures which measure the egalitarianism of several
popular cryptocurrencies. The most exciting result arises from the comparison between
the proof-of-work and proof-of-stake mechanisms. Although blockchain folklore argued in
favour of proof-of-work systems in terms of egalitarianism, our results show that, in fact, it
is proof-of-stake systems which are more egalitarian.
Our work provides the first step towards establishing a concrete framework of egalitari-
anism evaluation in the cryptocurrency ecosystem. Future work will focus in evaluating
more existing cryptocurrencies and investigating variations of consensus mechanisms such
as delegated proof-of-stake. Additionally, we leave for future work the treatment of more
complex economical models of the mining game such as dynamic systems and adversarial
strategies, as well as economies of scale in the multitude of parameters we have ignored,
such as electricity bulk pricing. We conjecture the consideration of such parameters will
exacerbate the gap between proof-of-work and proof-of-stake which we have illustrated in
this work.
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A Proofs
I Lemma 3 (Sybil strategies). Fix a cryptocurrency c and an investment period interval d.
Given capital v, for every natural number i ∈ N?, it holds that fc,d(v) ≤ fc,d(i · v).
Proof. We prove the statement via contradiction. Assume that for capital v exists a natural
number i ∈ N? such that fc,d(v) > fc,d(i · v). Also assume that for capital v the optimal
strategy is B′, so: max
B∈B
E[B(v)] = E[B′(v)]. Then, for capital i · v exists a strategy B′′, such
that the capital is split into i equally-sized parts and the strategy B′ is applied on each
part. Given that the executions of the substrategies on these parts are independent, then
the expected returns for the strategy B′′ are:
E[B′′(i · v)] = i · E[B′(v)] = i ·max
B∈B
E[B(v)] (1)
It also holds that B′′ is at best the optimal strategy, so:
max
B∈B
E[B(i · v)] ≥ E[B′′(i · v)] (1)=⇒ max
B∈B
E[B(i · v)] ≥ i ·max
B∈B
E[B(v)] (2)
However, it should hold that:
fc,d(v) > fc,d(i · v)⇒
max
B∈B
E[B(v)]− v
v
>
max
B∈B
E[B(i · v)]− i · v
i · v
(2)=⇒
max
B∈B
E[B(v)]− v
v
>
i ·max
B∈B
E[B(v)]− i · v
i · v ⇒
max
B∈B
E[B(v)]− v
v
>
max
B∈B
E[B(v)]− v
v
(3)
which is impossible. J
B Integer programming formulation
In our experiments, we used a Dynamic Programming solution to solve the Knapsack problem
in order to allocate mining machines upfront. An optimal solution could use the proceeds of
mining not only to reinvest in electricity, but also to purchase new machines. This is captured
by the Integer Programming formulation in Figure 3, which gives the optimal investment
strategy in the full model.
This maximization problem tries to optimize the freshly generated proceeds. The variables
to solve for, xm,t ∈ N, describe the number of machines of type m that the investor holds at
time t. We assume machines cannot be sold back to the market, hence xm,t−0 ≤ xm,t. The
investment starts with initial capital v and no machines, hence xm,0 = 0. The program can
then decide to purchase machines as time goes by. For any costs, it first uses up the initial
capital v to pay for them (this initial capital is useless to keep, as it does not contribute to
freshly generated proceeds, which are our utility here), and subsequently uses the proceeds to
pay for any remaining costs. Capital which is not expended to pay for costs is discarded by
the max operator in the maximization clause. The condition the integer program is subject to
requires that the investment has non-negative capital at every point in time, and hence does
not run out of money. In this formulation, it is assumed that d is a set of consecutive integers
representing indexed hours of execution (a more fine-grained solution can be obtained by
increasing this temporal resolution as needed).
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Maximize
max(0, v −
∑
t∈d\d[0]
∑
m∈m
(xm,t − xm,t−1)ic(mi)−
∑
t∈d
∑
m∈m
xm,t · ecr(m) · ec)
+
∑
t∈d
∑
m∈m
xm,t · 3600 · hr(m)thr(c) · br(c) · bgr(c) · tp(c)
subject to∑
t′≤t
t′ 6=d[0]
∑
m∈m
(xm,t′ − xm,t′−1)(−ic(mi) + (t− t′ + 1)|E[ir(m)]) ≤ v for t ∈ d
xm,t−1 ≤ xm,t for m ∈ m and t ∈ d \ d[0]
xm,d[0] = 0 for m ∈ m
and xm,t ∈ N for m ∈ m and t ∈ d
Figure 3 An Integer Programming formulation of the optimal investment strategy in our model.
C Parameters affecting egalitarianism
Throughout this paper, we have assumed certain parameters (cryptocurrency prices, electri-
city prices, duration of investment and mining difficulty) remain constant throughout the
investment period. Furthermore, we have taken into account current market values to the
best of our knowledge. We note that, while the actual egalitarianism numbers may change
depending on these parameters, the general shape of egalitarian curves and the qualitative
comparison between different cryptocurrencies remains the same. To illustrate this point, we
have measured the egalitarian curve of Bitcoin for varying parameter values. Our results are
demonstrated in Figure 4.
D Machines
Data for mining machines was obtained from a multitude of resources on the Internet9. Data
for graphics processing units (GPU) and central processing units (CPU) was obtained by
calculating the median of multiple user benchmarks when available10. The price of each
machine used in our experiments is the reported retails price of machine at date of access.
When a new machine is not available for sale, the price of a used or refurbished machine is
9 An exhaustive list of our resources includes the online stores https://whattomine.com/, https://
cryptominer.deals/, https://www.asicminervalue.com/, https://www.reddit.com/r/MoneroMining/
comments/9omjfb/rtx_2080_ti_mining_monero_at_1228hs_and_more/, https://www.newegg.com/,
https://www.amazon.com/, https://shop.bitmain.com.cn, https://www.cryptouniverse.at,
https://canaan.io, http://miner.ebang.com.cn, https://swminershop.com, https://asicminer.co,
https://estrahash.com, http://www.innosilicon.com, https://pangolinminer.com, https:
//www.bitfily.io, https://hashdeploy.net/, https://www.pantech.company, https://
www.cryptominerbros.com, https://pandaminer.com, https://minersdeals.com, https://
sharkmining.com, https://shop.miningstore.com, https://mineshop.eu, https://www.bitmart.co.za,
https://shop.futurebit.io, https://www.aliexpress.com, https://bitech-mining.com,
https://asicminermarket.com, https://www.baikalminer.com, https://prominerz.com
10 https://www.xmrstak.com/tag/monero/, https://gpustats.com/, https://www.ethmonitoring.com/
benchmark, https://monerobenchmarks.info/
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Figure 4 Bitcoin egalitarian curves under varying parameters.
used. For reproducibility purposes, our complete data set is openly available in our repository.
For reference, we list a summary of those machines which provide a positive net gain per hour
after purchase (and can thus be profitable under our assumed parameter values) in Table 3.
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Table 3 Machines used in experiments.
Bitcoin
Name Hashes / s Watt Price (USD)
8 Nano Pro 76 · 1012 4,000 6,000
Whatsminer M10S 55 · 1012 3,500 2,558
Ebit E11++ 44 · 1012 1,980 2,024
8 Nano 44 · 1012 2,100 1,790
T3 43T 43 · 1012 2,100 2,279
Ebit E11+ 37 37 · 1012 2,035 1,517
WX6 34 · 1012 3,200 1,275
Whatsminer M10 33 · 1012 2,145 1,022
T2T-32T 32 · 1012 2,200 1,568
Ebit E11 30 · 1012 1,950 1,110
Antminer S15 (28T) 28 · 1012 1,596 1,249
Antminer S15 (27T) 27 · 1012 1,539 1,363
T2T-25T 25 · 1012 2,050 1,150
Snow Panther B1+ 24.5 · 1012 2,100 580
T2T-24T 24 · 1012 1,980 1,350
S11i 24 · 1012 2,300 937
Antminer T15 23 · 1012 1,541 840
Antminer S11 20.5 · 1012 1,435 512
AvalonMiner 921 20 · 1012 1,800 415
Antminer S9-Hydro 18 · 1012 1,728 713
Ebit E10 18 · 1012 1,650 2,999
T2 Terminator 17.2 · 1012 1,570 1,118
DragonMint T1 16 · 1012 1,480 1,600
AvalonMiner 851 15 · 1012 1,450 380
Antminer S9i 14.5 · 1012 1,365 440
Antminer S9j 14.5 · 1012 1,365 307
AvalonMiner 841 13.6 · 1012 1,290 354.44
SX6i 11 · 1012 900 419
Ethereum
Name Hashes / s Watt Price (USD)
A10 EthMaster 485 · 106 850 5,399
A10 EthMaster 432 · 106 740 4,799
Shark Extreme 2
(8×NVIDIA GTX 1080 Ti) 420 · 10
6 1,500 9,779
Maximus+ (8×1080TI) 370 · 106 2,200 7,520
A10 EthMaster 365 · 106 650 4,099
Ethereum Mining Rig
(12x AMD RX 570 GPU) 360 · 10
6 1,600 4,345
ULTRON (8×P104) 320 · 106 1,700 5,338
Ethereum Mining Rig
(8× NVIDIA 1080 8GB GPU) 310 · 10
6 1,100 6,267
Shark Extreme 2
(6×NVIDIA GTX 1080 Ti) 300 · 10
6 1,200 7,880
Shark Extreme 2 (8×AMD Vega 56) 290 · 106 1,700 6,879
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Shark Extreme 2
(8×NVIDIA GTX 1070 Ti 8 GB) 245 · 10
6 1,400 6,679
Shark Extreme 2 (8×AMD RX 580) 240 · 106 1,100 4,590
Ethereum Mining Rig
(8×AMD MSI RX 580 GPU) 240 · 10
6 1,000 3,453
IMPERIUM+ (8×RX 570/580) 230 · 106 1,300 3,577
Antminer G2 220 · 106 1,200 3,799
Shark Extreme 2 (6×AMD Vega 56) 220 · 106 1,275 5,680
Ethereum Mining Rig
(8×AMD MSI RX 570 GPU) 220 · 10
6 950 3,2253
Shark Extreme 2
(4×NVIDIA GTX 1080 Ti) 210 · 10
6 800 4,979
Antminer E3 190 · 106 760 654
Shark Extreme 2
(6×NVIDIA GTX 1070 Ti 8 GB) 185 · 10
6 1,050 5,480
Shark Extreme 2 (6×AMD RX 580) 180 · 106 825 3,890
Ethereum Mining Rig
(6×AMD RX580 8gb GPU) 180 · 10
6 900 2,342
Ethereum Mining Rig
(6×AMD MSI RX 580 GPU) 175 · 10
6 860 1,967
Ethereum Mining Rig
(6×AMD MSI RX 580 GPU) 170 · 10
6 750 2,156
Thorium 6580 GPU 160.2 · 106 700 4,297
Thorium 6570 GPU 144 · 106 750 3,974
Shark Extreme 2
(4×NVIDIA GTX 1070 Ti 8 GB) 122 · 10
6 600 3,580
Zodiac 6-1060 GPU 120.78 · 106 750 3,222
Shark Extreme 2 (4×AMD RX 580) 120 · 106 550 2,590
Ethereum Mining Rig
(6×AMD MSI RX 560) 80 · 10
6 370 1,823
GeForce RTX 2080Ti 55 · 106 155 1,249
GeForce GTX 1080Ti 51.11 · 106 175 999
RX Vega 64 44 · 106 230 399
GeForce RTX 2080 41 · 106 105 699
GeForce GTX TITAN X 40 · 106 250 1,099
P104-100 38.89 · 106 127 569
RX Vega 56 38.75 · 106 210 339
GeForce RTX 2070 38.5 · 106 140 499
GeForce GTX 1080 34.07 · 106 121 633
RX 580 31.3 · 106 110 185
GeForce GTX 1070 31.1 · 106 108 319
GeForce GTX 1070Ti 30.83 · 106 107 489
RX 570 29.85 · 106 65 142
RX 480 29.71 · 106 70 237
RX 470 29 · 106 60 340
GeForce GTX 1060 (6GB) 23.81 · 106 95 264
GeForce GTX 1060 (3GB) 19.32 · 106 69 189
GeForce GTX 1050Ti 13.18 · 106 75 169
Litecoin
Name Hashes / s Watt Price (USD)
D. Karakostas, A. Kiayias, C. Nasikas, and D. Zindros 7:21
A6 LTCMaster 123 · 107 1,500 3,000
A4+ LTCMaster 62 · 107 750 1,500
Apollo LTC Pod 10 · 107 100 299
Monero
Name Hashes / s Watt Price (USD)
Shark Extreme 2 (8×AMD Vega 56) 14,800 1,700 6,879
Shark Extreme 2 (6×AMD Vega 56) 11,000 1,275 5,680
Shark Extreme 2 (8×AMD RX 580) 6,880 1,100 4,590
Shark Extreme 2 (6×AMD RX 580) 5,160 825 3,890
Shark Extreme 2 (4×AMD RX 580) 3,440 550 2,590
RX Vega 64 2,020 140 399
RX Vega 56 1,920 140 339
GeForce RTX 2080Ti 1,200 150 1,249
RX 580 976 89 185
RX 480 965 140 237
Ryzen Threadripper 1920X 955 140 435
GeForce RTX 2080 898 132 699
GeForce GTX 2070 880 140 499
RX 470 840 120 340
GeForce GTX 1070 777 112 319
RX 570 740 90 142
Ryzen 7 2700X 715 105 309
Ryzen 5 1600X 532 47 179
Ryzen 5 1600 531 65 159
Decred
Name Hashes / s Watt Price (USD)
Whatsminer D1 44 · 1012 2,200 1,588
Whatsminer DCR 44 · 1012 2,200 1,890
Antminer DR5 35 · 1012 1,610 1,282
STU-U1+ 12.8 · 1012 1,850 1,560
STU-U1 11 · 1012 1,600 1,389
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